514 (2006) 1038 (1983) See Brief for Respondent 39 (“[I]t was entirely unclear if [this juror] understood any of the trial court’squestions and her answers are equivocal at best.”). . See, That is obvious, in part, because the Superior Court rested on this procedural bar to deny Foster’s, The Court takes me to task for not “follow[ing my] own rule,”. 28 U. S. C. §1257(a), but only if such a judgment or decree raises a question of federal law, Michigan v. Long, Both parties agree that Foster has demonstrated a prima facie case, and that the prosecutors have offered race-neutral reasons for their strikes. By allowing Foster to relitigate his Batson claim by bringing this newly discovered evidence to the fore, the Court upends Batson’s deferential framework. We agree with that approach. (c) Evidence that a prosecutor’s reasons for striking a black prospective juror apply equally to an otherwise similar nonblack prospective juror who is allowed to serve tends to suggest purposeful discrimination. Trial Record 446. 1, 2 Record 190, 219 (Lundy deposition) (hereinafter Tr.). To be sure, we often presume that a “state court decide[s] the case the way it did because it believed that federal law required it to do so.” Long, 463 U. S., at 1040–1041. . On a record far less cold than today’s, the Supreme Court of Georgia long ago (on direct appeal) rejected that claim by giving great deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations. 434 (2011) The first indication to that effect is Lanier’s mischaracterization of the record. In its entirety, the State Supreme Court order states: “Upon consideration of the Application for Certificate of Probable Cause to appeal the denial of habeas corpus, it is ordered that it be hereby denied. See ante, at 7–8. [5] A prosecutor is entitled to disbelieve a juror’s voir dire answers, of course. Foster, 258 Ga., at 738, 374 S. E. 2d, at 192. (capitalization omitted). On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court is bound to accept that evaluation of the federal question, but whether that conclusion justifies relief under state res judicata law is a matter for that court to decide. Indeed, at times the State has been downright indignant. See Tr. . AND THE FAILINGS OF . Other justifications for striking Hood fail to withstand scrutiny because no concerns were expressed with regard to similar white prospective jurors. 45609 (Ga. 1988), pp. 110–111 (new trial hearing; emphasis added). To this point, it is appropriate for the Court to address the “mountain of authority” cited by the Defendants because it is upon this authority that the Brand Defendants primarily rely for their no-duty argument. There is neither an “opinion” nor any resolution of federal law that “fairly appears” on the face of the unexplained order. challenge to be sustained if there is a reasonable probability that race was a factor in the exercise of the peremptory or where the judge finds it is more likely than not that, but for the defendant’s race, the peremptory would not have … During jury selection at his trial, the State exercised peremptory strikes against all four black prospective jurors qualified to serve. [3] That court’s invocation of res judicata therefore poses no impediment to our review of Foster’s Batson claim. Lundy testified that these were examples of the type of “notes that the team—the State would take down during voir dire to help select the jury in Mr. Foster’s case.” Tr. Or perhaps it reveals only Lundy’s personal thoughts about selecting black jurors, an “opinion” with which (we can “guess”) Lanier disagreed. The court nonetheless announced that it would “mak[e] findings of fact and conclusions of law” on that claim. Ante, at 20–21. The Court’s analysis with respect to Hood is unavailing. . 545 U. S. 231, MIKELL, Judge. Oklahoma.[1]. There is also the shifting explanations, the misrepresentations of the record, and the persistent focus on race in the prosecution's file. Justice Thomas criticized the court's determination of jurisdiction, arguing that "[t]he far more likely explanation for the [Georgia Supreme Court's] denial of habeas relief is that Foster's claim is procedurally barred ...[,] a question of state law that [the U.S. Supreme Court] is powerless to review. 33, p. 2 (juror Cochran, divorced); id., No. Such references are inconsistent with attempts to “actively see[k]” a black juror. . Lanier, in explaining the strike, told the trial court that in apparent contradiction to that exchange (which represented the only time that Garrett was asked about the topic during voir dire), he had “noted that [Garrett] attended Main High School, which is only two blocks from where [the victim] lived and certainly in the neighborhood. Larry Chisolm, District Attorney, Cecelia Harris, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. 729 (1991) These notes showed that someone had highlighted the names of black jurors and had written the letter “B” next to their names. The Georgia Supreme Court denied a certificate of appeal. See Brief for Respondent 34–35; see also App. Petitioner Timothy Foster was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in a Georgia court. Included in the list of barred claims was “Petitioner[’s] alleg[ation] that the State used peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of Batson.” Id., at 175–176. Both Justice Alito's concurrence and Justice Thomas's dissent pointed out that, under Georgia state law, Foster's murder conviction and death sentence may not be nullified by the decision.[13][14]. 22–31. . . Confronted with cases like this in the past, this Court has vacated and remanded for clarification from the state court before proceeding to decide the merits of the underlying claim. 175. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the state law doctrine of res judicata does not preclude a Batson challenge against peremptory challenges if new evidence has emerged. (2) A draft of an affidavit that had been prepared by Lundy “at Lanier’s request” for submission to the state trial court in response to Foster’s motion for a new trial. Foster was put on trial for White’s murder, convicted, and sentenced to death. Under the doctrine established by Railroad Company v. Lockwood, 17 Wall. (plurality opinion). For these reasons, the State argues, “none of the specific pieces of new evidence [found in the file] shows an intent to discriminate.” Ibid. 78 (2000) See id., at 44–47; id., at 86, 105, 110–111 (new trial hearing); Trial Record 433–435 (brief in opposition to new trial). On each one, the juror’s response indicating his or her race had been circled. Argued March 2, 1981. In Batson cases, the “decisive question will be whether counsel’s race-neutral explanation for a peremptory challenge should be believed.” Hernandez v. New York, “[T]he principle of finality” is “essential to the operation of our criminal justice system.” Teague v. Lane, Only in the number six position did a white prospective juror appear, and she had informed the court during voir dire that she could not “say positively” that she could impose the death penalty even if the evidence warranted it. Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court. 452 U.S. 337 . In the decades since, Foster has sought to vacate his conviction and death sentence on the ground that prosecutors violated Batson v. Kentucky, I haven’t had a juror yet that understood what that meant.”); id., at 1101–1102 (“[Court]: I still say that these questions need changing overnight, because one out of a hundred jurors, I think is about all that’s gone along with knowing what [you’re asking].”). . But this was not some off-the-cuff remark; it was an intricate story expounded by the prosecution in writing, laid out over three single-spaced pages in a brief filed with the trial court. 478 (2008) On their face, Lanier’s justifications for the strike seem reasonable enough. “was 46 years old, married 13 years to her husband who works at GE, buying her own home and [was recommended by a third party to] this prosecutor. Id., at 192–196. Among other documents, the file contained (1) copies of the jury venire list on which the names of each black prospective juror were highlighted in bright green, with a legend indicating that the highlighting “represents Blacks”; (2) a draft affidavit from an investigator comparing black prospective jurors and concluding, “If it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [this one] might be okay”; (3) notes identifying black prospective jurors as “B#1,” “B#2,” and “B#3”; (4) notes with “N” (for “no”) appearing next to the names of all black prospective jurors; (5) a list titled “[D]efinite NO’s” containing six names, including the names of all of the qualified black prospective jurors; (6) a document with notes on the Church of Christ that was annotated “NO. On Strike: Supreme Court to Decide on Racial Discrimination in Jury Selection. If the State declined to strike a particular prospective juror, Foster then had the opportunity to do so. 41 (pretrial hearing); but see id., at 120 (Lanier testifying that the strikes were “based on many factors and not purely on race.” (emphasis added) (new trial hearing)). 10, p. 1; id., No. 545 U. S. 231 While that proceeding was pending, Foster, through the Georgia Open Records Act, obtained from the State copies of the file used by the prosecution during his trial. 5 Trial Transcript 893. The State argues that it “was actively seeking a black juror.” Brief for Respondent 12; see also App. A: Yes.”); Nor did his petition for rehearing, which was also denied. In support of that claim, Foster offered new evidence, namely, the prosecution’s jury selection notes, which he had obtained through a Georgia open-records request. 215; Tr. In 1986 Timothy Foster, a black 18-year-old, was accused of killing Queen Madge White, a 79-year-old white woman and retired schoolteacher in Georgia. The comparison between Hood and Graves is particu-larly salient. Foster was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. We turn first to Marilyn Garrett. 192. However, because [Foster] claims that additional evidence allegedly supporting this ground was discovered subsequent to the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling [on direct appeal], this court will review the Batson claim as to whether [Foster] has shown any change in the facts sufficient to overcome the res judicata bar.” App. . After considering the evidence, the state habeas court denied relief. 435 U. S. 1014 (eop) , and like the Court (and both petitioner and respondent) I agree that we cannot conclude from the brief order issued by the Supreme Court of Georgia that its decision was based wholly on state law. Thus, the court held that the Batson claim was “without merit.” App. But this claim is not credible. Garrett’s name appeared on that list, which the State concedes was written by one of the prosecutors. . See, e.g., Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 466 S. E. 2d 837, 839 (1996) (“Since this issue was raised and resolved in Martin’s direct appeal, it should not have been readdressed by the habeas court”); Davis v. Thomas, 261 Ga. 687, 689, 410 S. E. 2d 110, 112 (1991) (“This issue was raised on direct appeal, and this court determined that it had no merit. evidence of intent as may be available.” Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., Any uncertainties concerning the documents are pertinent only as potential limits on their probative value. Throughout this process, both parties had the opportunity to question the prospective jurors and lodge challenges for cause. (footnote omitted). Judge Janis L. Sammartino and Magistrate Judge Mitchell D. Dembin … Time and again, the state courts have rejected that claim. The unexplained denial of relief by the Supreme Court of Georgia is. A: No, it has no effect on me.”). See id., at 35. 301. The State argues that “because [Foster] did not call either of the prosecutors to the stand” to testify in his state habeas proceedings, “he can only speculate as to the meaning of various markings and writings” on thosepages, “the author of many of them, and whether the twoprosecutors at trial (District Attorney Lanier and Assistant District Attorney Pullen) even saw many of them.” Brief for Respondent 20. Before reviewing the factual record in this case, a brief word is in order regarding the contents of the prosecution’s file that Foster obtained through his Georgia Open Records Act requests. Throughout all stages of this litigation, the State has strenuously objected that “race [was] not a factor” in its jury selection strategy. Argued December 7-8, 1966. . . CHATMAN v. The STATE. While the state habeas proceeding was pending, Foster filed a series of requests under the Georgia Open Records Act, see Ga. Code Ann. Pl. could ever warrant setting aside the procedural bar,” Hall, supra, at 377, 687 S. E. 2d, at 818, let alone intimate that a prisoner may relitigate a claim already decided against him merely because he might win this second time around. It was common practice in the office to highlight in yellow those jurors who had prior case experience. Consequently, Juror Garrett was excused.” Ibid. But the State Superior Court’s opinion is not the “judgmen[t] . , a Georgia prisoner must establish in his application that at least one of his claims has “arguable merit.” Ga. Sup. 301 (emphasis added). She told the officers that her boyfriend, Foster, had killed White and given items stolen from White's house to her and various family members. . . No. In addition, the focus on race in the prosecution’s file plainly demonstrates a concerted effort to keep black prospective jurors off the jury. we … Nonsense. Neither does. Id., at 293, 308. Then, having found a constitu-tional violation, the Court remanded for a new trial. 35, 53, and 78.” (pretrial hearing)); id., at 114 (“Three out of four jurors who professed to be members of the Church of Christ, went off for [cause related to opposition to the death penalty].” (new trial hearing)); Trial Record 435 (“Church of Christ jurors Terry (#35), Green (#53), and Waters (#78) [were] excused for cause due to feeling[s] against the death penalty.” (brief in opposition to new trial)). Batson, 476 U. S., at 98, n. 21. We have “made it clear that in considering a Batson objection, or in reviewing a ruling claimed to be Batson error, all of the circumstances that bear upon the issue of racial animosity must be consulted.” Snyder, 552 U. S., at 478. See (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“[C]laims will ordinarily not be entertained under §2255 that have already been rejected on direct review”); Withrow v. Williams, She was perceived by the prosecutor as having a stable home environment, of the right age and no association with any disadvantaged youth organizations.” Ibid. "[4] Justice Alito explained that the lower court's habeas decision noted that Foster's Batson claim was based on new evidence discovered after Foster's original trial and therefore the order of the Georgia Supreme Court "held ... that Foster's Batson claim, as presented in his state habeas petition, lacked arguable merit. Foster argued that the State’s use of those strikes was racially motivated, in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79. 335 (2007) In response to Foster’s pre-trial Batson challenge, District Attorney Lanier noted all eight reasons, but explained: “The only thing I was concerned about, and I will state it for the record. Accordingly, Ake does not mean that we can simply disregard the possibility that the decision under review may have a state-law component. Neither affidavit provided further explanation of the documents, and neither Lanier nor Pullen testified in the habeas proceeding. In this case, the Georgia habeas court’s analysis in the section of its opinion labeled “Batson claim” proceeded as follows: “The [State] argues that this claim is not reviewable due to the doctrine of res judicata. I reaffirm my testimony made during the motion for new trial hearing as to how I used my peremptory jury strikes and the basis and reasons for those strikes.” Id., at 169 (paragraph numeral omitted). 86–2218–2 (Super. Our case law requires the Court to defer to the trial court’s finding that the State’s race-neutral concerns about Hood’s “soft-spoken[ness] and slow[ness] in responding to the death penalty questions” were “credible.” App. See 5 Trial Transcript 955–956 (two questions on insanity and one on mental illness); ibid. . . 46 (“[Hood’s] religious preference is Church of Christ. In a situation like the one presented here, the correct approach is for us to decide the question of federal law and then to remand the case to the state court so that it can reassess its decision on the state-law question in light of our decision on the underlying federal issue.[5]. See App. . in . (“Q: Do you have any feeling about the insanity defense? . [19], Justice Thomas dissented. To begin, it “reeks of afterthought,” Miller-El, 545 U. S., at 246, having never before been made in the nearly 30-year history of this litigation: not in the trial court, not in the state habeas court, and not even in the State’s brief in opposition to Foster’s petition for certiorari. “First, a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a preemptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race; second, if that showing has been made, the prosecution must offer a race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question; and third, in light of the parties’ submissions, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination.” Snyder v. Louisiana, 99 (2011) . . That court denied relief, and the Georgia Supreme Court declined to issue the Certificate of Probable Cause necessary under Georgia law for Foster to pursue an appeal. No.192. Foster v. Georgia, The sales slip dated 10/39/70 was introduced in evidence as well as the sales slip dated 10/14/70, … . Additionally, Lanier claimed that he struck Garrett because she was too young, and the “State was looking for older jurors that would not easily identify with the defendant.” Trial Record 439; see App. Exh. (“Credibility can be measured by, among other factors, . Based on this lengthy “Batson analysis,” the state habeas court concluded that Foster’s renewed Batson claim was “without merit.” Because the state court’s application of res judicata thus “depend[ed] on a federal constitutional ruling, [that] prong of the court’s holding is not independent of federal law, and [this Court’s] jurisdiction is not precluded.” Ake v. Oklahoma, The Court also second-guesses the prosecution’s strike of Hood because of his questionable stance on the death penalty. The order of the Georgia Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. by the highest court of [Georgia] in which a decision could be had” subject to our certiorari jurisdiction. 107, p. 2 (juror Hatch, divorced); App. 309 (1989) If he can, then the court affords plenary review of the arguably meritorious claim. (per curiam); see also, e.g., Johnson v. Risk, After extensive court proceedings, including two visits to the State Supreme Court,[2] additional petitions for certiorari to this Court,[3] and a jury trial on the issue of intellectual disability, Foster was denied relief on that claim. Id., at 191. 417 U. S. 333, Ante, at 7–8. When application of a state law bar “depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court’s holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded.” Ake v. Oklahoma, Id., at 182, 190. A state habeas court rejected it in 2013. Yet Garrett was 34, and the State declined to strike eight white prospective jurors under the age of 36. Again, that should be “the end of the matter.” Hernandez, 500 U. S., at 375 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The trial court rejected that claim, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. Foster centers his Batson claim on the strikes of two black prospective jurors, Marilyn Garrett and Eddie Hood. She was replaced by Juror Cadle [who] was acceptable to the State. 28 U. S. C. §2254, apply. After the Georgia Supreme Court rejected Foster’s Batson argument on direct appeal, he filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in this Court, but his petition did not raise a Batson claim,[1] and the petition was denied. But whether the prosecution planned to strike Garrett all along or only at the last minute seems irrelevant to the more than 10 race-neutral reasons the prosecution supplied for striking Garrett. Ibid. 549 U. S. 327, For this reason, the Court’s conclusion that the prosecution violated Batson rests mostly on arguments at Foster’s disposal decades ago. BATSON 55 bias.” 14. 31, p. 3; see App. . (emphasis added). 45 (calling into question whether Lanier’s “thought process” was based on those lists). 45 (pretrial hearing). 721 (1993) Juror Questionnaire No. And a draft affidavit from the prosecution’s investigator stated his view that “[i]f it comes down to having to pick one of the black jurors, [Marilyn] Garrett, might be okay.” Id., at 345 (emphasis added); see also ibid. It does so without adequately grappling with the possibility that we lack jurisdiction. Pieces of the new evidence support some of these concerns. See App. With respect to Garrett and Hood, such evidence is compelling. Foster v. Chatman, 578 U.S. ___ (2016), was a United States Supreme Court case in which the Court held that the state law doctrine of res judicata does not preclude a Batson challenge against peremptory challenges if new evidence has emerged. Roulain v. Martin, 266 Ga. 353, 354, 466 S. E. 2d 837, 839 (1996) (opining that a state habeas court “would certainly be bound by the ruling [in the petitioner’s direct appeal] regardless of whether that ruling may be erroneous”). v. CHATMAN FOSTER Syllabus and persistent focus on race, leads to the conclusion that the striking of those prospective jurors was “motivated in substantial part by dis-criminatory intent.” Snyder, 552 U. S., at 485. 470 U. S. 68, In justifying that strike to the trial court, he articulated a laundry list of reasons. Foster sought review of this decision, and this Court granted certiorari to review the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court. Pp. Harris v. Reed, 1719–1723. And that’s just one case: Foster v. Chatman. Petitioner Timothy Foster was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death in a Georgia court. The [S]tate had, in his jury notes, listed this juror as questionable. We conclude that it does not. 489 U. S. 255, See, e.g., Capital Cities Media, Inc. v. Toole, Thomas, J., filed a dissenting opinion. View foster v chatman from CRJS 104 at Mercyhurst University. 152 (1984) No Black Church.” App. 241 (2005) Lanier also explained to the trial court that he struck Garrett because he “felt that she was less than truthful” in her answers in voir dire. This left the State with an additional strike it had not anticipated or allocated. But the predicate for the State’s account—that Garrett was “listed” by the prosecution as “questionable,” making that strike a last-minute race-neutral decision—was false. . 6 Tr. 1. 247. The complainant, Lisa Stubbs, told them that her boyfriend, petitioner Timothy Foster, had killed White and had distributed the goods stolen from White’s home to Stubbs and family members. 89-V-2275, Superior Georgia res judicata law may also include a “miscarriage of justice” exception, but that appears to capture only the exceptionally rare claim of actual innocence, and so is not at issue here. District Attorney Stephen Lanier and Assistant District Attorney Douglas Pullen represented the State at trial. Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736, 374 S. E. 2d 188 (1988).
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